We could use a surge of reality

CAIRO, Egypt — The perspective from Cairo on the Bush-Cheney plans for Iraq is that they have no relation with the reality of the Middle East. The overwhelming consensus is that they are doomed from the start.

Assuming that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the head of a coalition government, is going to be able to deliver on verbal promises to take military action against the same factions that keep him in power is naïve, at best. Al-Maliki's goal is to stay in office and he will not seriously attack his base of power.

For Middle Easterners, al-Maliki's position parallels that of Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who also runs a coalition government. Olmert may promise Washington that there will be no Israeli expansion of the settlements on the West Bank, but in order to retain power, Olmert has no intention of alienating key partners in his coalition by implementing those promises.

Another explosive idea circulating in the region is that the U.S. wants to move Kurdish troops from Northern Iraq to Baghdad to help stabilize the situation in the city. Both Sunni and Shiite Arabs in Baghdad will see the premise of Kurdish forces as a vehicle for Kurds to seek revenge for Saddam Hussein's policies against Kurds. Rather than being welcomed, the Kurds will quickly become a target for attacks by both Sunni and Shiite Arabs and a very bad situation will be worse.

A bolder U.S. plan would be to begin serious planning for the withdrawal of U.S. troops, including the abandonment of all our military bases in Iraq. As long as we attempt to keep a military presence in Iraq, it will be used by all parties opposed to U.S. policies in the region as a symbol of our continuing occupation of Iraq.

We seem to have forgotten that Osama bin Laden's initial appeal was his call to remove U.S. troops from Saudi Arabian soil. Iraqi national feelings about having Western troops stationed on their soil, among Arabs at least, are even stronger than in Saudi Arabia.

If we wish to increase troop levels in the region, send them to Afghanistan before it is too late, but make the military presence secondary to economic reform. Delivering jobs, electricity, roads and protection against local warlords would win more support on the ground than another division of troops.

We have to create an environment in which Afghans feel that supporting the present government in Kabul has more benefits than returning to the Taliban. Unfortunately, so far we haven't delivered enough of the goods.

The same is true for Somalia, where we have an opportunity to offer an alternative to the Islamic Courts movement but this will only succeed if we supply economic aid very quickly, work to integrate warlord forces into a single army, and have the Ethiopians leave as quickly as possible.

Other steps would include talking to all parties in the region, particularly Syria and Iran. Ironically, the rulers of Damascus may not be happy with the long-term perspective of Shiite states in Lebanon and Iraq and will want more allies as a counterbalance.

Change our vocabulary and talk about America seeking justice, a fundamental Muslim concept, rather than democracy, which is often interpreted here as a code word to cover our support for dictatorial governments that run rigged elections.

Drop the term "war on terrorism," which has as much chance of success as Lyndon Johnson's "war on poverty." Identify real enemies and realistic goals. The language used by President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and others in this administration may play well in the U.S., but it reflects an insensitivity to the cultural and religious differences from Morocco to Indonesia.

Jere L. Bacharach is professor emeritus of Middle East history at the University of Washington and a former director of the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies.