Guest columnist
9/11 panel's compelling account demands political attention

By Floyd J. McKay
Special to The Times

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No Earl Warren or Otto Kerner dominated this body, and its unanimous adoption by a panel of folks who are normally quite partisan should mean that this bulky document (567 pages, including 116 pages of footnotes) will be taken seriously by leaders of both parties.

It should be, and at $10 it is affordable reading for every American. It's well-written and at times compelling.

The Warren Commission's role was to dispel conspiracy talk in the assassination of President John Kennedy, and it failed in that mission. The Kerner Commission was a reaction to race riots of the '60s, but it was dumped into the super-charged politics of 1968 and President Lyndon Johnson backed away from its ambitious recommendations.

Either George W. Bush or John Kerry must pay attention to the 9/11 commission, as must the Congress.

Setting aside the highly publicized question of appointing an "intelligence czar," there is much here that demands attention.

Particular attention should be paid to recommendations dealing with foreign policy. This will be uncomfortable for Bush, for the commission calls for the multinational diplomacy that Bush rejected as he plunged into Iraq. Citing the dramatic drop in support for the United States in the Muslim world after initial support in the wake of 9/11, the commission pleads for America to define its ideals in the Muslim world. The commission notes the serious impact of American treatment of prisoners in Iraq and urges adoption of rules based on the Geneva Convention.

Again the need for international cooperation is stressed as the commission calls for a biometric screening system for our border crossings, and also for use in high-security areas. This will upset some civil libertarians, but it may be the price of survival in today's world.

At times the report is compelling reading. The frustrations of CIA and military officers who tracked Osama bin Laden and came within hours of killing him reveal both the strengths and weaknesses of the system prior to 9/11. We knew bin Laden was a threat, but without overwhelming proof we could not risk scores of civilian deaths to take him out. After 9/11, that changed, but President Clinton and President Bush both rejected invading Afghanistan prior to 9/11, for fear it would inflame the Islamic world.

From a political standpoint, neither Clinton nor Bush is shown as doing enough to deal with a fragmented and inefficient bureaucracy. The report vindicates nearly every statement by Richard Clarke, the White House counterterrorism chief under both presidents. Clarke was the stuck needle in the terrorism record, constantly calling for more action.

Clinton was clearly more engaged; Bush's interest was less obvious and it would be very difficult to make a case that Bush and his top advisers put a priority on bin Laden. The commission, aware of its need to avoid partisanship, is careful in its portrait of the pre-9/11 Bush White House, but terrorism does not seem to have been a priority.

The report drives the stake in the heart of the argument that Saddam Hussein and al-Qaida were linked. The commission clearly considers the role of Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen as much more important than Iraq's in relation to bin Laden. The report puts the specious Iraqi connection in the pocket of Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, taking perhaps some of the onus off the back of Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney, who persisted in the Iraqi connection long after it had been debunked by researchers.

The Iraq-bin Laden connection is perhaps the most-political moment in the report. The vast majority deals with the key agencies in the counter-terrorism struggle, the CIA, FBI and Pentagon. Remarkably, the most-cautious voices in terms of launching a military strike on bin Laden were those of the military. The reader is struck both by the sometimes-remarkable abilities of the FBI and CIA, and by their equally remarkable blunders.

We are reminded that "government" is really a bunch of people and that the miracles of technology are both a blessing and a curse. Terrorists, the report warns, "simply could buy off the shelf and harvest the products of a $3 trillion a year telecommunications industry," to launch sophisticated attacks from one of the most primitive countries in the world.

Compelling and important, this book should gather no dust if we are serious about security in the 21st century.

Floyd J. McKay, a journalism professor emeritus at Western Washington University, is a regular contributor to Times editorial pages. E-mail him at floydmckay@yahoo.com