Colombia hostage rescue 5 years in the works

BOGOTÁ, Colombia — For months before a group of disguised Colombian soldiers carried out a daring rescue of three U.S. citizens and a prominent Colombian politician from a guerrilla camp, a team of U.S. Special Forces joined elite Colombian troops tracking the hostages across the jungle in the country's southern fringes.

The U.S. team was supported by a vast intelligence-gathering operation based in the U.S. Embassy in Bogotá, far to the north. There, a special 100-person unit made up of Special Forces planners, hostage negotiators and intelligence analysts worked to keep track of the hostages. They also awaited the moment when the rescue would begin.

That moment came in June after a Colombian army major hatched an unconventional plan. Further developed by Colombian intelligence agents, the plan abandoned the idea of a military raid and relied instead on tricking a rebel group notorious for killing hostages into simply handing over 15 of their most prominent captives. Those included three U.S. defense contractors held five years in remote jungle camps and Ingrid Betancourt, a politician of French-Colombian citizenship whose plight had become a cause celebre in Europe.

As Colombian planners made last-minute preparations June 30, the U.S. ambassador in Bogotá, William Brownfield, briefed Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and other Bush administration officials in a videoconference call. Two days later, Colombian commandos scooped up the Americans, Betancourt and 11 Colombian soldiers and policemen.

U.S. troops did not participate directly in the operation, but behind the rescue in a jungle clearing stood years of clandestine American work. It included the deployment of elite U.S. Special Forces in areas where rebel fighters roam, a vast intelligence-gathering operation, and training programs on intercepting and subverting rebel communications.

"This mission was a Colombian concept, a Colombian plan, a Colombian training operation, then a Colombian operation," Brownfield said. "We, however, had been working with them more than five years on every single element that came to pass that pulled off this operation."

Just months before "Operation Check," Brownfield promised the families of the three Americans, whose single-engine plane had crashed in 2003, that he would never recommend that the Bush administration approve a Colombian rescue that would put their loved ones at risk.

The Bush administration had an understanding with Colombia's government that any operation to rescue the Americans required U.S. approval. But Brownfield and a team of 15 U.S. strategists thought the Colombian plan could succeed.

The operation included infiltrators in the highest reaches of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), as well as Colombian commandos playing the part of relief workers and guerrillas and an elaborate scheme to intervene in the rebels' radio network.

In the frantic days before the operation, Colombian and U.S. officials discussed details at length, troubleshooting and considering all possibilities.

Brownfield said U.S. officials thought the risk to the American hostages — key leverage in the FARC's negotiations to win the freedom of guerrillas in Colombian jails — would be low. Should the FARC discover the deception, the ambassador reasoned, they would simply disappear into the jungle with their trophy prisoners.

"So we took a deep breath," Brownfield recalled, "and said, 'Proceed.' "