How Musharraf fell short of U.S. hopes

JERUSALEM — Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf seemed to be one of the Bush administration's most valuable foreign friends after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, when he denounced al-Qaida and the Taliban and joined the U.S.-declared war on terrorism.

But the value of that friendship has come under question again and again in the past six years.

Musharraf's declaration of emergency rule Saturday has isolated him at home and abroad, and it suggests President Bush risked his goals and principles for an ally who couldn't deliver on a fundamental promise: that the Pakistani leader alone could hold together the country while facing down militant Islamists.

Bush, who often is accused of having naive faith in democracy, made the ultimate realist's bargain to help prop up an authoritarian leader. The move Musharraf has taken now has raised fears the world might end up with a nuclear-armed state that is both more fractured and host to a stronger jihadist force.

The move is making Bush's deal look more like the one U.S. presidents made with the shah of Iran, whose authoritarian rule opened the way in 1979 to an anti-U.S. Islamist regime.

Bush has sought to reassure Americans that Musharraf, who took power in a bloodless coup in 1999, was worthy of their trust. "He shares the same concerns about radicals and extremists as I do and as the American people do," Bush said at an Aug. 9 news conference at the White House.

Falling short

Yet U.S. officials have conceded they had concerns the Pakistani government was not doing enough to foster democracy and halt nuclear proliferation. And more and more U.S. officials are convinced Musharraf's regime hasn't done enough to fight militant Islam.

One of the administration's top priorities has been halting the spread of nuclear know-how. Yet Musharraf has not been willing to allow the United Nations' nuclear-watchdog agency to interview A.Q. Khan, the father of the Pakistani nuclear program, which has been a source of knowledge for countries such as North Korea and Iran.

Musharraf promised Bush that he eventually would give up his position as head of the army, Pakistan's most powerful institution, and hold free and fair elections at the risk of ending his own rule. Yet his declaration of emergency rule has been widely judged as an effort to avoid having the country's Supreme Court void his recent re-election.

And although Musharraf's government has lost hundreds of soldiers since 2001 fighting al-Qaida and the Taliban, there has always been an ambivalence about the fight. Some Pakistani officials, from the army's intelligence agency and other units, have had ties to radical groups and believe they have a strategic value as a proxy in facing down India, which along with Pakistan claims Kashmir.

And the regime is wary of taking too many casualties or alienating some parts of its population in a fight that many Pakistanis believe is largely inspired by the United States.

Pentagon frustrated

Many Pentagon officials have become more frustrated by their partnership with the Pakistanis, believing the army is all too eager to have the $11 billion in U.S. aid it has received since 2001 but less eager to fight.

Indeed, a conflict developed between the two governments over Musharraf's agreement last year with tribal leaders that cleared the way for the army to withdraw from areas near the border of Afghanistan.

Pakistani officials portrayed the deal as a masterstroke that would reduce casualties among troops while enlisting the tribal authorities in the battle against Islamist militants.

But many U.S. officials came to believe the accord was simply a way for the Pakistani military to avoid involvement. And by last winter, they had concluded the deal had allowed the Taliban and al-Qaida to regroup and strengthen their hold over the lawless border areas.

A series of top U.S. officials, including Vice President Dick Cheney, trooped through Pakistan with the message that something had to change. In late July, amplifying their complaints, the U.S. intelligence community issued an official judgment that foreign terrorists were rebuilding in the tribal areas.

While the Islamists were strengthening their position against Musharraf, so was the moderate opposition.

U.S. officials say privately that while opposition groups this year have been highly visible in challenging Musharraf's rule, most Pakistanis have a far different view of democracy from Americans'. Pakistan is still largely a feudal society, and its politics often represent the clashes of blocs dominated by the few powerful families that have ruled for generations.

For these American officials, it is harder to imagine a true democratic revolution than a political disintegration with frightening consequences for the United States.

That's why they've supported Musharraf — and why the White House, while critical of his declaration of emergency rule, is tiptoeing around the question of whether the U.S. would cut off the aid that is its real leverage.

Few Democrats have seriously pushed for a cutoff of aid, not wanting to risk blame for a collapse of the country many believe is the central front in the war on terrorism.

But Pakistani officials in Washington in recent months have acknowledged that frictions with the administration have begun to cause some fraying in their support in Congress.

"The trend is in the wrong direction," an official said during the summer. He insisted, however, that backing remained strong in the White House and Congress.

The latest crisis, with its suggestion that Musharraf acted because his power might be ebbing, will put that unconditional support to the test.