Anbar province: Success story or danger zone?

RAMADI, Iraq — The mood was celebratory. Dozens of tribal sheiks clad in traditional finery gathered for a feast after the central government promised them $120 million to help Anbar province recover from years of fighting between U.S. forces and insurgents.

They dug their hands into communal platters of rice and roasted meat. Cheeks were kissed. Hands were shaken. Cold drinks were guzzled beneath tents offering shelter from the blazing heat.

An Iraqi government official watching the scene last week marveled at how the Sunni leaders who once backed insurgent groups had banded together.

"The next big step is when the same kind of cooperation occurs between the Sunnis and the Shiites," he said wryly. "That's a different story."

The official's comments illustrated the different prisms through which Anbar's metamorphosis can be viewed. The western province that once was the hub of the Sunni insurgency is now a region of relative stability.

But is it an example of what can be achieved if President Bush's military strategy continues? Or should it be regarded as a reminder of how difficult it will be to make similar gains elsewhere? Military and political leaders warn against resting hopes for all of Iraq on this province, where U.S. forces are empowering the people who used to fight them.

Some say that the practice could backfire by spawning new militias that might well wreak more havoc on the country in the long term. They also warn that things still could slide backward here if the Shiite-dominated central government does not live up to its promises of support for the province's Sunni leadership, such as the $120 million package.

"There are too many unique variables," said Maj. Jeff Pool, a spokesman for the U.S. forces deployed in the western province, when asked if what has happened in Anbar can be replicated. The vast, desolate swath of desert's homogenous population has made it easier for provincial leaders to find common ground.

"It's not exporting this model here that will solve Iraq's problems," Pool said. "It's local leaders elsewhere finding out what works in their areas."

That requires local leaders to join forces as Anbar's leaders have done, but this will be challenging in areas not facing the singular threat that galvanized the Anbar sheiks: the influence of Islamic militant groups claiming allegiance to al-Qaida in Iraq.

"It's harder for them to buy into the idea of working with the coalition in other areas because they have other threats: Shiite threats, Kurdish influence," said Maj. Ed Sullivan, who is on his second deployment in Anbar. He was first here in 2004-05.

"A lot of people look for a cookie-cutter theory — the Anbar model. There is no Anbar model," Sullivan said. Rather, a unique combination of events ushered in change.

In 2004-05, the province was the heart of the Sunni-led insurgency and one of the deadliest for U.S. forces in Iraq. Locals were more enamored of the militants than of the foreign forces. That changed in 2006, when Islamic militants declared the province part of their self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq, subject to Draconian laws and brutal punishment for violators and opponents of their rule.

This drove the sheiks, who saw their local economies dying and their influence waning, to reject the insurgents.

"If it weren't for that, we would've been forcing them," said Sullivan. "It wouldn't have worked."

Nearly 6,000 U.S. troops are spread across Anbar, including 4,000 sent as part of Bush's deployment earlier this year of an additional 28,500 troops. Supporters of the strategy say the extra troops have made it possible for the province to remain somewhat stable in the wake of the sheiks' decision, putting it on the path to long-term recovery.

According to the military, daily attacks in the provincial capital, Ramadi, have dropped from an average of 25 to 30 a day to less than one per day.

In other parts of the country, the Anbar method is being applied in varying degrees.

There are neighborhood groups in parts of Baghdad. In the capital of Diyala province, another insurgent stronghold, the Baqouba Guardians are patrolling the streets. All of these groups include former insurgents who pledge allegiance to the U.S. and Iraqi forces. If they pass security checks, they are trained and allowed to take up law-enforcement roles.

U.S. commanders in Diyala say the Guardians are helping turn around a city that was largely in insurgent hands at the beginning of the year. They man checkpoints in their khaki T-shirts and reflective belts and have taken over abandoned houses, which they use as patrol bases.

Residents say they feel safer, but U.S. troops also acknowledge that it is difficult to keep track of the different armed groups on the streets. Occasional bursts of gunfire are part of the backdrop of the city, and the soldiers often have no idea who fired them.

Rivalries lead to periodic exchanges of fire between Guardians, police and Iraqi soldiers.

Skeptics warn that groups such as the Guardians could turn into militias once U.S. troops begin leaving Iraq, and turn their guns on each other.

"Do we want armed tribes running this country?" asked Army Col. Patrick Stackpole, commander of the 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division in ethnically mixed northern Iraq.

Vali Nasr, an expert on the Sunni-Shiite conflict at the Council on Foreign Relations, said the attempt to spread the Anbar methodology could backfire in the long term by putting the majority Shiites on the defensive.

"Successes that the U.S. military claims in western Iraq have come following the U.S. arming the Shiites' adversaries — Sunni tribes — most likely raising rather than soothing Shiite anxieties," Nasr said.

Los Angeles Times staff writers

Alexandra Zavis, Said Rifai and Ned Parker contributed to this report.