Analysis | Can study findings mesh with Iraq reality?

BAGHDAD, Iraq – Ideas that sound sensible in Washington can founder in the harsh reality of Baghdad's streets. Proposals to hand power more quickly to Iraqi forces, for example, overlook the fact that few of those forces are battle-ready and that deep divisions remain among Iraq's leaders.

The Iraq Study Group recommended today that President Bush threaten to reduce economic and military support if Iraqi leaders fail to meet deadlines aimed at curbing the violence. It also called for U.S. troops to move more into training roles and hand over security responsibility more quickly than now planned to Iraqi forces.

Bush has indicated he is leaning toward a quicker handover, although he may be less warm to other proposals from the group such as reaching out to Iran and Syria.

But the ranks of Iraqi forces are heavily Shiite and infiltrated by Shiite militias. And many U.S. experts believe Iraqi forces won't be ready for combat for another three to five years.

Former Pentagon analyst Anthony Cordesman estimates that only about a third of the Iraqi battalions are effective and "it will take years, not months, to fix this situation."

Troops on the ground echo that.

"They're not really skilled. They sit around and drink (tea) instead of going on their patrols. They're afraid to do what needs to be done," Spc. Diego Cabezas, 20, of Fresno, Calif., said of the Iraqi forces he works with in the insurgent stronghold of Ramadi in Anbar province.

"Even if we do pull out, it's still going to be chaotic here. The government isn't strong enough and the army isn't ready to handle things on its own," he said.

The readiness of troops is just one thorny issue facing the U.S. in Iraq.

Fed up with three years of bloodshed, most Iraqis agree that Washington needs to change its strategy. But they remain dangerously divided on the road ahead. That makes it far from certain that U.S. pressure or American-dictated benchmarks can bring them together.

Over the last three years, Iraq's quarrelsome factions have appeared all but impervious to American timetables, either failing to meet them or meeting them in a way that sometimes made the situation worse.

Instead of forging unity, Iraqi political energies have been directed at bolstering the position of various sectarian groups as they maneuver for power. That has produced a weak, ineffective government, divided over many issues despite the presence of Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds in top positions.

Top Shiite politician Abdul-Aziz al-Hakim, for example, who is close to the government, has complained for more than a year that the Americans should "unleash" Iraqi forces to finish off resistance by Sunni insurgents.

But such talk doesn't set well with key Sunni members of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's government, who fear this step could increase attacks on fellow Sunnis.

To the Sunni leadership, Shiite militias and death squads — some believed led by Shiite politicians — pose the single largest threat to stability. In contrast, Shiite leaders blame Sunni insurgents, some of whom are believed to have links to mainstream politicians, for the chaos.

Neither side appears willing to make the first move to dismantle armed groups for fear of leaving their own communities vulnerable to attack.

Even if the politicians agreed, it is unclear whether anyone has the stature to disband armed groups without more bloodshed.

On the Sunni side, al-Qaida in Iraq has no interest in a negotiated settlement. And on the Shiite side, the biggest militia, the Mahdi Army, appears riddled with factions — some of which give only nominal allegiance to leader Muqtada al-Sadr.

"There is a vacuum of authority resulting from the government's weakness and its inability to exercise its legitimate powers," parliament Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani said. "This has produced so much chaos."