Rumsfeld urged big changes in Iraq strategy

WASHINGTON — Two days before he resigned as defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld submitted to the White House a classified memo that acknowledged the Bush administration's strategy in Iraq was not working and called for a major course correction.

"In my view it is time for a major adjustment," wrote Rumsfeld, a symbol of a dogged, stay-the-course policy. "Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing in Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough."

Nor did Rumsfeld seem confident that the administration would readily develop an effective alternative. To limit political fallout, he suggested a campaign to lower public expectations.

"Announce that whatever new approach the U.S. decides on, the U.S. is doing so on a trial basis," he wrote. "This will give us the ability to readjust and move to another course, if necessary, and therefore not 'lose.' "

"Recast the U.S. military mission and the U.S. goals [how we talk about them] — go minimalist," he added. Rumsfeld's memo suggests frustration with the pace of turning over responsibility to Iraqi authorities; in fact, the memo calls for an examination of ideas that roughly parallel troop-withdrawal proposals presented by some of the White House's sharpest Democratic critics.

The memo's discussion of possible troop-reduction options offers a counterpoint to Rumsfeld's frequent public suggestions that discussions about force levels are driven by requests from military commanders.

Instead, the memo presents several ideas for troop redeployments or withdrawals that appear to conflict with recent public pronouncements from commanders emphasizing the need to maintain troop levels.

The memo sometimes has a finger-wagging tone as Rumsfeld says Iraqis must "pull up their socks," and suggests reconstruction aid should be withheld in violent areas to avoid rewarding "bad behavior."

Other options called for shrinking the number of bases, establishing benchmarks that would mark the Iraqis' progress toward political, economic and security goals and conducting a "reverse embeds" program to attach Iraqi soldiers with U.S. squads.

The memo was finished one day after President Bush interviewed Texas A&M University President Robert Gates as a potential successor to Rumsfeld and one day before the midterm elections. By then a Republican setback at the polls and a reconsideration of Iraq strategy appeared likely.

Rumsfeld may have been trying to shape the coming discussion and present himself as open to change. The memo provides no indication that he intended to leave his Pentagon post. It is unclear whether he knew he was about to be replaced.

Told The New York Times had obtained a copy of the memo, a Pentagon spokesman confirmed its authenticity. "As it became clear that people were considering options for the way forward, the secretary had some views on the subject, and this memo reflects those views," spokesman Eric Ruff said.

With Rumsfeld's resignation, the options no longer have the same weight. Some have been discarded as the Bush administration tries to adjust its strategy in Iraq. But others, such as increasing the number of advisers attached to Iraqi forces, live on and have been recommended by others.

Rumsfeld will leave when Gates is confirmed by the Senate, expected this month.

Troubled evolution

Rumsfeld's memo reflects mounting concern over a war that, as he put it, has evolved from "major combat operations to counterterrorism, to counterinsurgency, to dealing with death squads and sectarian violence."

The first section contains two pages of options that Rumsfeld describes as "above the line" ideas worthy of consideration. Some that he found intriguing appear to reflect a long-held view that the United States should use relatively modest force in intervening in foreign countries to avoid creating a dependency on U.S. power. That approach, critics say, left the United States unprepared to deal with the chaos that followed the ouster of Saddam Hussein.

Whittling and switching

One option calls for modest troop withdrawals "so Iraqis know they have to pull up their socks, step up and take responsibility for their country."

Another calls for redeploying U.S. troops from "vulnerable positions" to safer areas in Iraq or Kuwait, where they would serve as a "quick reaction force." That idea is similar to a plan suggested by Rep. John Murtha, D-Pa., one soundly rebuffed by the White House.

Still another option calls for consolidating the number of U.S. bases in Iraq from 55 to five by July. At the same time, Rumsfeld all but dismisses a firm date for removing U.S. forces from Iraq.

One of the more provocative options would punish provinces that failed to cooperate with the Americans by withdrawing economic assistance and security. "Stop rewarding bad behavior, as was done in Fallujah when they pushed in reconstruction funds, and start rewarding good behavior," the option reads. "No more reconstruction assistance in areas where there is violence."

Restive areas

Fallujah has been the focus of reconstruction efforts after a U.S. offensive crippled city services and damaged scores of buildings, leaving few options beyond rebuilding or evacuating the city. The Marines now consider it one of the few relatively stable areas in dangerous Anbar province.

Many other towns in the region have become even more hostile because economic aid has been minimal, leaving residents feeling neglected, military officers say.

In any case, administration officials indicated last week that withholding aid was not under serious consideration. Reflecting exasperation with much of the U.S. government, another option in Rumsfeld's memo raises the possibility of using military reservists to "beef up" the Iraqi government's ministries. "Give up on trying to get other USG Departments to do it," he writes.

Taking a leaf out of Saddam's book, Rumsfeld seemed to see some merit in the former dictator's practice of paying Iraqi leaders. "Provide money to key political and religious leaders [as Saddam Hussein did], to get them to help us get through this difficult period," one option reads.

The list of favored options notably does not mention the "clear, hold and build" approach that the White House has touted as its strategy for waging counterinsurgency. That is a troop-intensive approach that calls for clearing and holding contested areas with U.S. and Iraqi troops and then carrying out reconstruction programs to win popular support. Nor does the list make the withdrawal of U.S. forces contingent on improving conditions in Iraq.

The final page of the memo is a brief list of six "less attractive" options, which Rumsfeld describes as "below the line."

These include an "aggressive federalism plan," an international conference modeled on the Dayton accords that produced an agreement on Bosnia and an idea being seriously discussed by senior administration officials: temporarily sending 20,000 or more U.S. troops to Baghdad to try to improve security in the Iraqi capital and regain momentum.

Moving a large fraction of U.S. forces to Baghdad to "attempt to control it," Rumsfeld writes without further elaboration, would be "below the line."