Bremer says he sought more troops in spring 2004

WASHINGTON — As the Iraqi insurgency was escalating in spring 2004, top Pentagon authorities rejected an appeal for more troops from L. Paul Bremer, the senior U.S. official in Iraq, the Pentagon acknowledged Monday.

The request was disclosed in Bremer's new book about his tenure overseeing the first year of the U.S. occupation. Bremer reports that from the time he took the job, he had misgivings about the adequacy of U.S. and allied force levels in the country and says he raised the issue a number of times with top administration officials, including President Bush.

He describes the Pentagon as appearing eager to reduce U.S. troop strength in Iraq and says Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld never responded to his recommendation in May 2004 to add up to two divisions, or about 30,000 troops, to the approximately 160,000 coalition troops in Iraq at the time.

Pentagon spokesman Lawrence Di Rita said Monday that senior commanders did evaluate Bremer's recommendation and concluded "the level that they had there was the proper" one.

Bremer's 417-page book offers a detailed, chronological account of Bremer's controversial tour as head of the Coalition Provisional Authority from May 2003 — shortly after the fall of Baghdad — until June 2004, when Iraq's sovereignty was restored.

Noting that the Bush administration went into Iraq with assumptions that proved much rosier than the resulting reality, Bremer, a longtime diplomat, portrays himself essentially as making the most of an unexpectedly difficult situation.

The number of troops in Iraq emerges as a persistent source of concern for Bremer. The issue has drawn public dispute, with many legislators and defense experts arguing that more troops would have helped to contain the growth of a violent insurgency and ensure restoration of essential services. Administration officials say troop levels have reflected the recommendations of senior commanders, who have sought to balance security needs against worries that a larger occupation force would stir even greater local resentment.

Bremer recalls that shortly before leaving for Iraq in May 2003, he sent Rumsfeld a copy of a draft report by Rand Corp., a respected think tank, estimating that 500,000 troops would be needed to stabilize Iraq — more than three times the number of foreign troops then in the country. Rumsfeld did not respond, Bremer writes.

Bremer also said he raised his concerns with Bush at a lunch that month and again in June 2003 in a video link with a National Security Council meeting chaired by Bush.

Pentagon officials at the time described the opposition as limited to a relatively small number of former loyalists of ousted President Saddam Hussein and some foreign jihadist fighters.

White House spokesman Scott McClellan said Monday that the president's decisions on force levels have been based on recommendations from his military commanders. "They're the ones who are in the best position to say what they need to complete the mission," he said.

Bremer's own move early on to disband the old Iraqi army has been cited by some critics as a miscalculation that helped feed the insurgency by creating masses of unemployed and disgruntled Sunnis who had served under Saddam. Bremer defends the decision, which he said was taken with Rumsfeld's approval and after close review by the Pentagon's policy branch.