Hiding as police, militias hold the power in Basra

BASRA, Iraq — The most powerful and feared institution here in southern Iraq's largest city is a shadowy force of 200 to 300 police officers known collectively as the Jameat, who dominate the local police and who are said to murder and torture at will. They answer to the leaders of Basra's sectarian militias.

The militia infiltration in Basra's police force and government goes far beyond the Jameat; even the Basra police chief has said he trusts only a quarter of his own men. But the Jameat may be the most ominous example of the degree to which militias have come to dominate Basra.

The extent of its power became clear in September when a force of British troops in armored vehicles tried to rescue two special-operations soldiers who had been abducted and taken to the Jameat's headquarters in a police building in southwestern Basra.

According to three British soldiers there that day, a mob of 1,000 to 2,000 people — not the 200 or so first reported — rapidly gathered near the station, which the British troops had heavily damaged in an effort to free the captives. The soldiers were ultimately rescued from a house nearby, where they were being held by Shiite militiamen.

The British soldiers said many in the mob were armed with homemade gasoline bombs and grenades, and that the attack appeared to be a disciplined and coordinated response to the sacking of the Jameat headquarters. Iraqi men standing on cars ordered the mob to attack, they said, while rioters clambered on top of the armored vehicles and doused soldiers inside with gasoline.

"This was not a spontaneous public action," said Maj. Andy Hadfield, a British company commander. "It was closely organized and closely coordinated by a series of agitators."

Once a relaxed riverside getaway, Basra has slipped under the rule of fundamentalist Shiite militias with strong ties to Iran. The city has only 2,500 to 3,000 police officers, and several times that number in the province, while estimates of militia ranks have reached as high as 13,000 in Basra and its environs.

In recent months, lethal attacks on British forces and other rising violence in the city — including the murders of an Iraqi employee of The New York Times, Fakher Haider, and of a New York journalist, Steven Vincent — have shattered a convenient myth: that no matter how brutal the Sunni insurgency became, the Shiites in Basra would keep the city relatively peaceful, overseen by the soft touch of British forces.

The rise of the militias also represents another obstacle to the Bush administration's long-term goal of replacing U.S.-led forces with Iraqis. As in many restive parts of Iraq, none of the regular Basra police stations are close to being ready to operate on their own, said Sgt. Maj. Andy Johnson, a British soldier who helps train the police. "Progress is slow and you are fighting against decades of corruption," he said.

Even if the police and military units across Iraq achieve self-sufficiency, there is the added concern that they will disintegrate along sectarian lines when U.S. and British forces withdraw. "It's too early to tell" whether they will favor their own ethnic groups, a senior U.S. official said in a recent interview. "You don't necessarily instill a national identity in a military in two years."

Particularly not when the police ranks include groups like the Jameat. In the murky world of Basra's militias, it remains unclear how the Jameat emerged as such a powerful force. Officially, it is part of the Basra police, responsible for internal affairs and investigating major crimes like terrorism and murder — a role that in practice, other police say, allows it to operate with impunity.

A British diplomat said Jameat commanders "manage to exert a disproportionate influence and a policy of intimidation against the rest of the Iraqi police service and against ordinary people in Basra." The diplomat, who declined to be named because his government permits only senior foreign-service officers to speak for the record, said the Jameat had "the power to intimidate everybody" and "their crimes are the most serious crimes."

Like many other militias, the Jameat is involved in a wide variety of nefarious activities, according to other Iraqi police and officials, from the killings of former Baathists, to the kidnapping and murder of political rivals, to straightforward criminal pursuits. The major difference between the Jameat and other militias, Iraqis say, is that its members act with impunity.

"They consider themselves the No. 1 power in Basra," said one police commander, who requested anonymity out of fear of retribution against him and his family. "The people who like to murder and torture come from Internal Affairs," he said. "They get police uniforms, police vehicles and police identification."

Many police officers feel the same, said a British commander in Basra. "All of the police stations complain about abduction of their men and torture by the Jameat," said the officer, who requested anonymity because he was not authorized to speak on the subject.

Men with police uniforms and identification regularly abduct and kill Sunni Arabs, said Sheik Abdul Karim al-Dosari, leader of a local arm of the Iraqi Islamic Party, one of the largest Sunni parties. "Every week there are one or two incidents where the police come to arrest people, and then we find the bodies of these people."

In May, Basra's police chief, Hassan al-Sade, told The Guardian in London that militias were the "real power" in Basra and that he trusted only 25 percent of his force. Al-Sade, an appointee of Ayad Allawi, the former prime minister, who is a former Baathist and is often at odds with conservative Shiites, also said some officers carried out assassinations.

Other factions

Interviews with Iraqi police, other Iraqis and British soldiers suggest that several Shiite factions have strong ties to the Jameat. One is the Mahdi Army, a militia associated with the firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Another is the Fadila Party, which won tenuous control of the provincial government this year after allying with smaller parties. The Basra governor, Muhammad al-Waeli, a Fadila member, criticized the raid on the Jameat as "barbaric, savage and irresponsible."

One British officer said there were signs of increasing cooperation in Basra between factions from Fadila and the Mahdi Army. Another powerful militia is the Iranian-backed Badr Organization, an arm of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, which effectively ran Basra before Fadila took over and which nearly won a majority on the provincial council this year. The Badr group has fought with the Mahdi Army, and has also heavily infiltrated the police.

Sunni leaders have accused the Badr group of murdering Sunnis, a charge it denies. In December, before Fadila took over the Basra government, the Basra police reported that officers in the Internal Affairs unit — now part of the Jameat — were implicated in the killing of 10 former Baathists, according to a State Department report this year. The Basra chief of intelligence was removed, the report said, but kept command of Internal Affairs.

The Jameat is located near Hayaniya, a giant Shiite slum and base of support for the Mahdi Army. The two British special-operations soldiers were abducted the day after British troops arrested the Basra leader of the Mahdi Army, Ahmed Fartusi, on charges of attacking coalition forces. It is unclear how closely tied Fartusi remains to al-Sadr.

On Friday, British forces arrested 12 more men in Basra — mostly Mahdi supporters, including some policemen. No one who murders British soldiers "should be able to hide behind their uniform," the British military said in a statement that noted provincial leaders had banned police in Basra from working with British forces.

Iran also a worry

British soldiers say insurgent mortar attacks have increased. The militia influence is "very heavy," said Lance Sgt. Richard Smith. He cautions that Westerners who now try to navigate Basra risk showing up on television in the orange jumpsuits worn by captives. "If we weren't here, you'd probably get grabbed," he told a reporter.

On the streets, residents speak of increasing hostility toward the British. "Before, all people liked the British forces," said Fadel Mohsen, 41, who owns two household-goods stores. Like many in Basra, Mohsen has accepted the version of events put forth by the militias — a baseless claim that the two abducted British soldiers were Israeli spies.

British officials say the local Iraqi news media had until recently been willing to publish British statements but now appear too intimidated or otherwise unwilling to challenge accounts endorsed by militias — like the claims about Israeli spies.

Beyond worries about militia power is another concern: Neighboring Iran is increasing its grip. Iranians have long financed and trained the Badr militia. But there are growing signs Iran is providing substantial support to Badr rivals like the Mahdi Army.

Prime Minister Tony Blair said last week that he suspected that "Iranian elements" might have taught the militias how to make the lethal "shaped" charges that have killed eight British soldiers in roadside bombings since May.