9-11 panel finds 'no credible evidence' of link between al-Qaida and Iraq

By The Associated Press and The Washington Post

DENNIS COOK / AP FBI and CIA representatives are sworn in yesterday before the Sept. 11 panel. Left to right are FBI Assistant Director John Pistole, FBI Special Agent Deborah Doran, U.S. Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald, a CIA official identified only as "Dr. K.," and Ted Davis of the CIA.

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Related stories Chairman: "A commission unlike any other" Panel clears Saudi government 9-11 panel faults air defenses: Military chasing "phantom" plane Other links Full text of report [PDF] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

Although al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden asked for help from Iraq in the mid-1990s, Saddam's government never responded, according to a report by the commission staff based on interviews with government intelligence and law-enforcement officials. The report said "no credible evidence" has emerged that Iraq was involved in the Sept. 11 attacks.

The commission staff said suspected Sept. 11 mastermind Khalid Shaikh Mohammed initially outlined an attack involving 10 aircraft targeting both U.S. coasts, including Washington state. Mohammed proposed that he pilot one of the planes, kill all the male passengers, land the plane at a U.S. airport and make a "speech denouncing U.S. policies in the Middle East before releasing all the women and children," the report said.

Bin Laden rejected that plan as too complex, deciding instead on four aircraft piloted by handpicked terrorists. The report said the targets were chosen based on symbolism: the Pentagon, which represented the U.S. military; the World Trade Center, a symbol of American economic strength; the Capitol, the perceived source of U.S. support for Israel; and the White House. Training for the attacks began in 1999.

Making their case Comments by President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and national-security adviser Condoleezza Rice alleging links between al-Qaida and Iraq under Saddam Hussein: 2002 Rice, Sept. 25: "There clearly are contacts between al-Qaida and Iraq that can be documented; there clearly is testimony that some of the contacts have been important contacts and that there's a relationship here. ... And there are some al-Qaida personnel who found refuge in Baghdad." Bush, Oct. 7: "We know that Iraq and the al-Qaida terrorist network share a common enemy — the United States of America. We know that Iraq and al-Qaida have had high-level contacts that go back a decade," and "we've learned that Iraq has trained al-Qaida members in bomb-making and poisons and deadly gases." Bush, Oct. 14: "[Saddam] is a man that we know has had connections with al-Qaida. This is a man who, in my judgment, would like to use al-Qaida as a forward army." 2003 Bush, State of the Union address, Jan. 28: "And this Congress and the American people must recognize another threat. Evidence from intelligence sources, secret communications and statements by people now in custody reveal that Saddam Hussein aids and protects terrorists, including members of al-Qaida." Bush, Feb. 6: "Senior members of Iraqi intelligence and al-Qaida have met at least eight times since the early 1990s. Iraq has sent bomb-making and document-forgery experts to work with al-Qaida," and "Iraq has also provided al-Qaida with chemical- and biological-weapons training." Cheney, Sept. 14: "We learned more and more that there was a relationship between Iraq and al-Qaida that stretched back through most of the decade of the '90s." 2004 Cheney, Jan. 21: "I continue to believe — I think there's overwhelming evidence that there was a connection between al-Qaida and the Iraqi government. I'm very confident that there was an established relationship there." Cheney, Monday: Saddam "had long-established ties with al-Qaida." The Associated Press and Reuters

The attacks were planned for as early as May 2001, but they were pushed back to September, partly because al-Qaida sought to strike when Congress would be at the Capitol. A second wave of hijackings never materialized because Mohammed was too busy planning the Sept. 11 attacks, according to the report.

Al-Qaida is actively trying to replicate the destruction of that day, the report said, although it has been weakened by losing its sanctuary in Afghanistan and many leaders to U.S. strikes and arrests.

Under questioning, John Pistole, the FBI's top counterterrorism official, told the commission that the government "has probably prevented a few aviation attacks" in the United States since Sept. 11 but that some operatives in those plots are still at large.

The findings were released as the commission began its final two days of hearings on the terrorist attacks, which killed nearly 3,000 people. Today's hearing will focus on the Federal Aviation Administration and U.S. air defenses. The commission's final report is due July 26.

The conclusions that al-Qaida and Iraq had no cooperative relationship run counter to repeated assertions by President Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney and other administration officials. The claims that bin Laden and Saddam were in league were central to the administration's justification for going to war in Iraq.

As recently as Monday, Cheney said in a speech that the Iraqi president "had long-established ties with al-Qaida." And last fall he cited what he called a credible but unconfirmed intelligence report that Mohamed Atta, ringleader of the 19 Sept. 11 hijackers, met in the Czech Republic with a senior Iraqi intelligence official before the attacks.

The commission concluded no such meeting had occurred.

Secretary of State Colin Powell, asked about the commission report, said the administration stands by its assertions that there were links between al-Qaida and Iraq.

"I think we have said, and it is clear, that there is a connection, and we have seen these connections between al-Qaida and the regime of Saddam Hussein and we stick with that," Powell said in an interview on the al-Jazeera television network. "We have not said it was related to 9-11."

The commission report said bin Laden, then in Sudan, met with an Iraqi intelligence officer in 1994 to request space for al-Qaida training camps and assistance in obtaining weapons, "but Iraq apparently never responded." The meeting occurred even though bin Laden opposed Saddam's secular government and had sponsored anti-Saddam operatives in Iraq's Kurdish region.

The camps that were established in Afghanistan after bin Laden moved there in 1996 produced as many as 20,000 al-Qaida operatives and encouraged trainees to "think creatively about ways to commit mass murder," the report said.

The Sept. 11 plot gradually evolved from Mohammed's original vision but was hardly a seamless operation, the commission report said. Mohammed, who is in U.S. custody at an undisclosed overseas location, wanted up to 26 operatives for the four-plane plot, but only 19 participated because visa problems, family objections and other reasons kept some from entering the U.S.

HIGHLIGHTS More highlights 9-11 plan: 10 hijackings were envisioned, with targets on both coasts. Delays: The plot was postponed three times, beginning in mid-2000. Rifts: Al-Qaida's upper ranks and hijackers clashed over how to carry out attack.

The report reveals serious rifts among the hijackers and within the upper ranks of al-Qaida. One of the pilots crucial to the hijack plan, Ziad Jarrah, nearly abandoned the plot altogether, and probably would have been replaced by alleged conspirator Zacarias Moussaoui, the only person in the United States charged in connection with the attacks, the report concludes.

Planning for the assaults began in earnest in 1999. The targets considered over the next two years included not only those hit on Sept. 11, 2001, but also the headquarters of the CIA and FBI, nuclear power plants, and the "tallest buildings in California and Washington state," according to the report. Bin Laden was intent on striking the White House, while Atta and Mohammed argued that the Capitol was an easier target.

Atta told plot coordinator Ramzi Binalshibh that he would try to hit the White House but reserved the option to have Jarrah divert toward the Capitol if that proved impossible. As late as Sept. 9, 2001, the report indicates, the fourth target may have remained uncertain.

The investigators indicate that plan was beset by organizational problems and personality conflicts. Perhaps the most serious conflict was the one that developed between ringleader Atta and Jarrah, a trained pilot who would help commandeer Flight 93, which crashed in Pennsylvania. In a coded message, Mohammed referred to the two as an unhappy couple on the cusp of divorce.

Bin Laden also had to overcome objections to attacking the U.S. from Mullah Mohammed Omar, the Taliban leader who was under pressure from his Pakistani supporters to contain al-Qaida.

Omar, like bin Laden, has eluded U.S. capture.

Copyright © 2004 The Seattle Times Company

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