U.S. eyes negotiation to resolve Iraq conflict

By Christine Spolar and Deborah Horan
Chicago Tribune

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BAGHDAD, Iraq — After two weeks of bloody battles and tense standoffs, the struggle over Iraq's future focused yesterday on a table set up on a dusty street in the city of Fallujah.

On one side sat leaders of the Sunni Muslim city that has been under siege by U.S. Marines since April 5, a fight that has resulted in hundreds of civilian deaths and injuries. On the other side sat representatives of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the American military, which has vowed to bring to justice those who killed four civilian contractors in a Fallujah ambush last month and mutilated at least two of the bodies.

Though violence across Iraq has led the Pentagon to extend 21,000 soldiers' tours of duty and consider sending more troops to support the occupation, the United States is increasingly turning to negotiations as a tactic in quelling the insurgency.

The talks center on calming Fallujah, reining in the opposition led by militant Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his al-Mahdi Army militia, and securing the release of dozens of civilian hostages and one or two U.S. soldiers held by insurgents across the country.

By enlisting the aid of Iraqi Governing Council members, more-moderate Shiite clerics such as Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Husseini al-Sistani, and diplomats from other countries to stabilize Iraq, U.S. officials are betting that bargaining will succeed where a show of force has not.

The change in tactics reflects the U.S. desire not to invade Najaf, the Shiite holy city that is al-Sadr's home base, lest it inflicts widespread civilian casualties and further inflame emotions.

But another reason lies in the recognition of centuries of tradition in the Arab world, where bargaining always is the preferred method for conflict resolution.

In the Middle East, said Governing Council member Mahmoud Othman, bargaining is "not a matter of trust. It's politics and deals."

But the challenge of mediating a solution in Iraq is aggravated by the deep suspicion among ordinary Iraqis about American intentions, diplomats said.

"The Arab people are a very proud people," said Ahmed Kamal Aboulmagd, a Cairo attorney and consultant to the Arab League on promoting dialogue. "So they care very much for their image in the eyes of their constituency. You have to give them something to refer to as a win, because if you tilt the balance too far, they will rather die than be shamed."
 
Some Arab diplomats said that threats by the U.S.-led coalition to kill or capture al-Sadr before negotiations began complicated the process of winning his cooperation.

"You have to understand the Arab mentality," said Abdel Raouf el-Reedy, a former Egyptian diplomat and member of the negotiating team at the 1979 Camp David summit that forged a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel. "To say 'We are going to kill him or arrest him,' that kind of statement makes it very hard for him to negotiate clearly, knowing you have just pledged to kill him."

Othman, the Governing Council member, suggested that while al-Sadr should have been made to follow the lead of more-moderate Shiite clerics, the United States did not understand initially that negotiations were the better way to achieve that goal. On Friday, al-Sadr rejected demands to disband his militia and said he would not allow the United States to enter Najaf or Shiite holy sites. "There can be no sovereignty with the occupation forces," he said, according to The New York Times.

More than any other factor, veteran diplomats and attorneys said, negotiations in the Arab world hang on respect and shame.

While confrontation and intimidation can be effective tools in the West, Arabs say they studiously avoid direct statements or gestures that could embarrass an adversary in front of his constituents. In some cases, a show of respect can be more important than concrete concessions.

More than a year after the United States began its war to topple Saddam Hussein, many Iraqi leaders speak openly about where the Americans went wrong.

"If they had listened to us, we wouldn't have the situation we have now," said Naseer Chadirji, a Sunni member of the Governing Council, who said he has been baffled for much of the past year at the U.S. approach to Iraq.

"We thought the United States would be quicker than the United Nations to make decisions, but the United States just let the fires get bigger and bigger," he said.

Americans have stumbled in Iraq because they never properly understood their role and their image, said Adil Najam, a professor of negotiation and diplomacy at Massachusetts' Tufts University. It is as if the Americans were unsure of how to proceed after the fall of Hussein, Najam said.

"It's like walking into a souk (an Arab market) not knowing what you want or how to get it ... and somehow thinking you can just walk along somehow and find it," he said.

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