Analysis
Iraqi resistance shows skill beyond mere band of thugs

By Milt Bearden
The New York Times

E-mail this article Print this article Search archive

Certainly, there are Baathists and foreign terrorists operating against the U.S.-led coalition, and their ranks probably include criminals. But the overarching reality is that the U.S. and British forces are facing a resourceful adversary whose game plan may be more developed than originally thought.

The Iraqi resistance has taken a page from a sophisticated insurgency playbook in their confrontations with the U.S.-led coalition.

The insurgents' strategy could have been crafted by Sun Tzu, the Chinese military tactician, who more than 2,500 years ago wrote, in "The Art of War," that the highest realization of warfare is to attack the enemy's strategy.

So it was probably no accident that as U.S. forces approached Baghdad, expecting tough street fighting, the bulk of the Iraqi forces melted away. The U.S. troops, forced to shift strategy on the run, have been bedeviled by the consequences of those early chaotic days ever since.

Next, according to Sun Tzu, you attack his alliances.

This, again, is what the Iraqi insurgents did. Presumably acting on the assumption that the Jordanians were being too helpful to the United States, insurgents detonated a car bomb outside the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad on Aug. 7, killing 11 and wounding scores.

Less than three weeks later, as an increased role for the United Nations was debated, suicide bombers killed 22 people the organization's headquarters in Baghdad.

Then, in mid-October, as proposals for an expanded peacekeeping role for Turkey were argued, a suicide bomb detonated outside the Turkish chancery in Baghdad, killing one bystander and wounding a dozen others.

Baghdad was rocked in late October by a series of suicide bombings that killed dozens and wounded hundreds, including an attack on International Committee of the Red Cross headquarters.

In addition, there have been countless attacks against individual Iraqis viewed as allied with the United States, whether police recruits, members of the Iraqi Governing Council or figures in the judiciary. A pattern of attack against U.S. allies seems clear.

Since the focused attacks began, most Arab League missions in Baghdad have distanced themselves from the coalition; the U.N. secretary-general, Kofi Annan, has withdrawn his international staff from Baghdad; the Red Cross followed suit, prompting other international aid organizations to pare down in Baghdad as well.

Even Spain, part of the original coalition, has decided to withdraw the bulk of its diplomatic staff from Baghdad. It appears that after disrupting the American strategy, the insurgents have made progress in undermining its alliances.

Next, Sun Tzu prescribed, attack their army.

This is occurring with increasing lethality. To misread these attacks as desperation is dangerous. In the last two weeks, there have been multiple attacks on the coalition headquarters in Baghdad, with mortars and rockets landing inside the secure green zone.

Shoulder-fired missiles have brought down a Chinook helicopter, killing 16 soldiers. The crash of a Blackhawk helicopter, killing an additional six, is now believed to have been caused by a rocket-propelled grenade. One or two deaths are logged almost daily.

Ordinary criminals and thugs could not deliver this kind of punch. Mortar tubes, base plates and ammunition have to be smuggled to within a few thousand yards of the green zone, carefully set up and then launched either in a shoot-and-scoot attack or with timed delay.

Similarly, a rocket attack on the Al Rasheed Hotel while the deputy defense secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, was there required imagination, ability and training. Die-hards, maybe, but focused ones with a strategy and the skills to carry it out.

These growing attacks against U.S. forces have two clear goals: Inflict casualties and force a reaction that alienates the local population. Both are being achieved, as the quick-response raids by coalition troops to seize those behind the attacks fuel Iraqi alienation.

That suspicion is reflected in an incident described in a New York Times article about a group of U.S. soldiers who tossed handfuls of candy to Iraqi children along a road in Fallujah, inside the volatile Sunni triangle. "'Don't touch it, don't touch it!' Iraqi children squealed. 'It's poison from the Americans. It will kill you.' "

This is reminiscent of Afghan children being terrified that Soviet soldiers were seeding the countryside with booby-trapped toys, or that wells had been poisoned, or food aid adulterated. All those stories were false, many of them propagated by the CIA. But the important thing was that the locals believed them.

Similarly, U.S. troops are not offering poisoned candy, but the point is that Iraqis believe it.

Sun Tzu also said "know yourself and know your enemy, and of a hundred battles you will have a hundred victories."

There were two stark lessons in the history of the 20th century: No nation that launched a war against another sovereign nation ever won. And every nationalist-based insurgency against a foreign occupation ultimately succeeded. This is not to say anything about whether or not the United States should have gone into Iraq or whether the insurgency there is a lasting one. But it indicates how difficult the situation may become.

Milt Bearden, a 30-year veteran in the CIA's Directorate of Operations, served as senior manager for clandestine operations.

Copyright © 2003 The Seattle Times Company