Lucky find reveals nuke-tank flaws

A Bechtel National quality-control official acknowledged "dumb luck" played a role in the discovery of a flawed inspection of an 8,000-gallon tank intended to contain radioactive liquids and gases at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, according to draft meeting minutes made available from a corporate whistle-blower.

Bechtel installed the stainless-steel tank in November 2003, receiving a $15 million payment for reaching that milestone. But in the months that followed, Bechtel officials realized they needed to do a more thorough inspection that helped uncover numerous problems with welds.

The tank troubles were an embarrassing setback for Bechtel, which is the prime contractor in an $11 billion effort to treat the toxic leftovers from America's nuclear bomb-making era. Some 53 million gallons of those wastes are now stored in 177 aging tanks, 67 of which are thought to already have leaked.

In an agreement signed with Washington state, the federal Energy Department has committed to begin processing the wastes into stable glass logs by 2011, although start-up is now not expected until 2017 or later.

Bechtel whistle-blowers say the tank problems are indicative of broader safety problems that still hang over the unfinished plant.

This year, six current and former Bechtel employees involved in quality assurance and engineering design contacted the Government Accountability Project (GAP), a nonprofit Hanford watchdog group. They alleged that management — under pressure to meet construction deadlines — sometimes ignored employee concerns about the design and construction process.

Quality control is critical in the plant's complex engineering and construction process. Once processing begins, any major leaks risk contamination that could sideline the plant for years, and other malfunctions could pose risks of explosions.

Bechtel executives say they stand behind the work done to date, which includes 60 percent of the design and 25 percent of the construction. They say their internal oversight system has successfully caught flawed vessel welds and other mistakes in the last six years.

"These were real shortcomings. They erode the confidence of our stakeholders, and do not meet our standards," said Tom Hash, chairman of Bechtel National, in April 6 testimony submitted to Congress. "We have fixed each of these problems and learned from them."

Several of the whistle-blowers gave hundreds of pages of internal documents to GAP detailing Bechtel's struggles to catch and fix errors, and how those problems should be reported. GAP has kept the names of all the whistle-blowers confidential.

In an August 2005 draft document, a Bechtel employee complained that he was discouraged from detailing problems in the proscribed written reports.

"This avoidance ... is repeated, pervasive and persistent in the face of repeated protests by myself," wrote the employee in a document that GAP provided The Seattle Times. "It appears that people have not been filing CARS [corrective action reports] in order to curry favor with management, which has discouraged CARS."

Bechtel officials also were wary of the Energy Department oversight, referring to the need to "push back" to ease scrutiny, said one whistle-blower interviewed by The Times.

"That was the mantra, and if I heard it twice, I heard it 100 times," said the former employee, who requested anonymity for fear that publicly speaking out would make it difficult to find new employment.

Tom Carpenter, a GAP investigator, says that the federal Department of Energy has done a poor job of oversight. He proposes that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which oversees private nuclear-power plants, be given authority to regulate Bechtel construction.

Energy Department officials dispute that criticism, saying they have been a successful watchdog. The department cited Bechtel in March for a "less than adequate safety and quality culture," and required changes.

"Safety is the No. 1 priority of this department," said Megan Barnett, a federal Energy Department spokeswoman.

State officials also are involved in overseeing the Bechtel project, with two full-time inspectors and three who visit once a week. So far, they think that Bechtel's own efforts — and the outside oversight — is strong enough to catch safety problems.

"We feel comfortable, at this point, that the facility will be safe and effective," said Jay Manning, the director of the state Department of Ecology.

Manning said the biggest risks lie with the older, leak-prone tanks that now store the waste. He is fearful that Congress, amid concerns about cost overruns and safety, may balk at funding the treatment plant.

Last week, Manning and Gov. Christine Gregoire went to Washington, D.C., to lobby for construction money.

"The last thing that you should do in terms of public safety and efficiency is slow down construction," Manning said.

In the fall of 2003, Bechtel appeared to reach a key milestone, installing the first of more than 60 tanks. The first tank would be installed in a "black cell" area that would be sealed and inaccessible once operations begin.

The stainless steel tank is to act as a "scrubber," receiving liquids and gases produced as the waste was melted.

Bechtel officials acknowledge mistakes in engineering, procurement and construction.

The Energy Department informed Bechtel engineers that the tank would need a full inspection, including X-rays of areas that would hold gas as well as liquids, according to department correspondence with Bechtel.

But Bechtel engineers failed to pass on the proper inspection requirements to the tank fabricator. So, the tank was not properly checked over by the fabricator, and also was not inspected properly by Bechtel prior to installation.

It wasn't until January 2004, after a subcontractor uncovered weld problems with tank nozzles, that Bechtel engineers determined the need for the fuller inspection.

At a May 2004 meeting, Bechtel official Ed Smith said it was "dumb luck" that enabled Bechtel to finally figure out the proper inspection procedures, according to draft minutes of the meeting.

After Smith's comments, Bechtel's project manager, Jim Henschel, tried to shift blame to the Energy Department. He faulted the government agency for a "poor choice of words in a contract document," according to the draft minutes. He later proclaimed that he's "ready for a fight" with the Energy Department.

By the time of the May meeting, department officials had requested return of the $15 million "milestone payment." The Energy Department, however, eventually backed off that request.

In recent months, the Energy Department began its own push back. The department in March fined Bechtel $198,000 for the troubles with the stainless-steel vessel as well as quality control, training and other violations.

Bechtel officials acknowledge Henschel's remarks, as recorded in the internal meeting minutes, were inaccurate. "He has since changed his tune ... ," said John Britton, a Bechtel spokesman. "We're working hard and this has been a painful lesson to learn." Additional efforts have included hiring more inspectors to watchdog contractors that fabricate plant equipment.

For the Energy Department, the safety concerns are part of a broader struggle to build a plant to treat the wastes now stored at Hanford. An initial attempt was scrapped in 1992, then a second effort faltered amid delays and construction costs that escalated from $6.9 billion to $15.2 billion.

In 2000, the Energy Department hired Bechtel to engineer and build the plant.

Last year, Energy Department officials discovered their computer models had underestimated the risks posed by earthquakes.

Since then, construction has slowed as engineers redesign the plant to stronger seismic standards.

Hal Bernton: 206-464-2581 or hbernton@seattletimes.com. Warren Cornwall: wcornwall@seattletimes.com