M's should be inspired by "Cleveland approach"

The specter of rebuilding raised this week by Mariners president Chuck Armstrong has definitely stirred up the fan base.

Armstrong said the Mariners will not be going after any big-name free agents this winter. He eschewed the notion of a "quick fix." He said, "We want to build something that will endure."

It's hard to disagree with any of that. In fact, I see it as an encouraging sign that the team's upper management is finally accepting the fact that their old approach was a failure.

Here's what Armstrong told me at the end of the 2005 season, the second of four out of five last-place finishes by the Mariners since the bottom dropped out of their franchise:

"It's incumbent on us — me, Bill [Bavasi], the baseball guys — to try to get the kind of players that will get this turned around as quickly as we can, as opposed to embarking on the Cleveland approach. Cleveland has such a nice little ballclub, yet we're averaging 10,000 more a game. We think we have a compact with the fans — ownership does."

Which helps explain Richie Sexson, Jarrod Washburn, Carlos Silva, Miguel Batista, Jose Vidro, Erik Bedard, et al — the contracts the Mariners kept piling on in an increasingly desperate attempt to dig out of their mess.

And it is a royal mess, deeper and far more complicated than just the 100 losses, give or take a few, that the Mariners will get for their $118 million payroll this year.

I know some of you are saying — screaming — that the Mariners don't need to stop investing; they just need to invest more wisely.

Very true. That is why the single-most important decision looming this winter — more vital than any single trade or signing, even the naming of a new manager — is the general managership.

It is more crucial than ever to find a visionary, someone with guts, imagination, sabermetric knowledge and a scouting foundation, to blaze the Mariners' trail out of the darkness. And to let that person do their job without undue interference from ownership or upper brass, who know how to put together a profitable, well-run business plan but should leave the baseball decisions to baseball people.

It won't be easy, because the new man (or woman) will be saddled from the start with nine players on guaranteed contracts adding up to $76 million, plus Bedard and Felix Hernandez combining for something like $14 million via arbitration.

That's $90 million for less than half a roster — not exactly a comfortable jumping-off point to reshape the team with splashy free agents. It almost guarantees the exploration of some veteran-for-youth trades, starting perhaps with Adrian Beltre, who will be earning $12 million in the final year of the five-year deal he signed in 2004.

And it makes you question the prudence of Armstrong's decision to nix the Washburn trade to Minnesota, which could have given the Mariners some more wiggle room in the payroll.

Do this makeover right, and the Mariners might be able to compete much faster than perhaps even Armstrong envisions — and without spending wildly on the free-agent market.

I said compete; not contend. That's unlikely for 2009, no matter how smartly they retool. Too many holes to fill for that. But any prospective GM should be excited by the challenge, and by the seeds of a pitching staff to build around.

I'm talking Felix, Bedard (who can be flipped at the trade deadline if his shoulder heals and he has the kind of season he's capable of), Brandon Morrow, Ryan Rowland-Smith and J.J. Putz, with Phillippe Aumont waiting in the wings, and No. 1 draft pick Josh Fields presumably getting signed eventually to augment the bullpen in the near future.

All that, and the No. 1, 2 or 3 draft pick next year to beef things up.

The "Cleveland approach," in case you've forgotten, involved GM Mark Shapiro's controversial decision, in late June 2002, with the Indians mired at 36-41 but just seven games out of first place, to trade ace Bartolo Colon to the Expos.

It was the first dramatic step in the systematic dismantling of a team that had won the AL Central title in 2001 — its sixth division title in seven years. The Indians suffered through records of 74-88 in '02 and 68-94 in '03, and attendance plummeted (to Armstrong's alarm), from 3 million-plus and perpetual sellouts from 1996 to 2001, to 1.7 million in 2003.

But fueled by that trade — which netted Grady Sizemore, Cliff Lee and Brandon Phillips (the latter blossoming into stardom in Cincinnati after the Indians gave up on him) — and other astute deals, plus a bountiful farm system, the Indians won 93 games in 2005, and 96 last year.

Attendance rose to 2.2 million in 2007, but it's doubtful Cleveland will ever replicate the dynamic that filled Jacobs Field for six magical seasons. The Indians have had a hugely disappointing 2008 season, but they've also been wiped out by injuries.

Here's how Shapiro answered, back in 2005, when I asked him if other teams could benefit by the "Cleveland approach."

"Every situation is unique," he replied. "In every situation, you have to do an inventory of who's there, and attempt to develop a plan. I do think there's some common ingredients in every situation. You need a balance of young players with the right veterans, strong leadership from the manager, and consistency in your approach.

"You can't start deviating. You need consistent decision-making and philosophy and vision. If you have all those things, you have a good chance, and the higher your payroll, the better your chance."

Sounds sensible, and directly applicable to Seattle's situation moving forward. So much so that one hopes that Shapiro's bright young assistant, Chris Antonetti, might yet be persuaded to give consideration to the Mariners' job.

Rebuilding, of course, is a precarious venture, fraught with danger. You can get caught in a morass of miscalculations and wind up on a treadmill to nowhere, like the Pirates (finishing their 16th straight losing season), the Royals (13 losing seasons in the past 14 years), the Reds (finishing their eighth straight losing season), the Orioles (finishing their 11th straight losing season) and the Brewers (12 straight losing seasons from 1993 to 2004), to name a few pitiful situations.

But the Orioles have hope again after going the route the Mariners are envisioning (and picking the Mariners' pockets on Bedard). The Brewers appear headed back to the playoffs for the first time since 1982.

It can work — and a lot faster than it took the Brewers. With the resources at their disposal — a beautiful ballpark and a loyal fan base that continues to show up through the darkest times — there's no reason that the Mariners, with the right leadership in baseball operations, can't expedite their turnaround.

I don't think contention in 2010 is an unreasonable goal — and I believe fans will stay on board if they sense a coherent plan is in place.

Heck, maybe future downtrodden teams will be taking about the "Seattle approach."

Larry Stone: 206-464-3146 or lstone@seattletimes.com