Rummy cannot be bothered

Give Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld credit: At least he is consistent. He is as dismissive of his military critics as he is of the American public in explaining the administration's Iraq policies.

A growing number of retired senior military officers have stepped forward to challenge Rumsfeld's stewardship of the Iraq war, from its beginning in 2003 through the insurgency toward civil war. Their ranks are populated by generals with key duties in Iraq during and after the invasion. Does Rumsfeld offer the public a candid rebuttal of their criticism? Does he challenge them on the facts, their expertise or strategic failings? No, he offers a cookie-cutter public-relations reply that their numbers are too insignificant to matter. References to thousands of active and retired generals is also meant to imply a bloated layer of fat in the flag ranks.

Rather than address the content of the criticism, the secretary's supporters produce a lengthy list of consultations, as if the sheer number of contacts were a substitute for an open mind and the embrace of contrary opinions.

All of the grumbling is coming from retired officers whose pensions and ranks at discharge are secure. This may not seem like a profile in courage, but the consequences of professional candor were made clear very early. In February 2003, before the war began, Gen. Erik Shinseki, Army chief of staff, estimated it would take hundreds of thousands of troops to occupy Iraq and carry out "all the normal responsibilities that go along with a situation like this."

Paul Wolfowitz, deputy secretary of defense, described Shinseki's comments as "wildly off the mark." The Army secretary who deferred to the general's expertise was fired by Rumsfeld, and Shinseki was shunted aside and retired by that June.

That memory is still raw. On Sunday, even Gen. Richard B. Meyers, recently retired chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and a Rumsfeld defender, said Shinseki's treatment was wrong.

Audible frustration by senior military officers is a long way from a challenge to the iron-clad civilian authority over the military. If things get nastier, expect Rumsfeld's defenders to impugn his critics with that dark canard.

In the absence of serious congressional oversight of the administration's handling of the war and its cost, the public has to go far afield for reliable information. The generals are speaking their minds.

Rumsfeld is as dismissive of them as he was of the soldier in Iraq who asked him about the scarcity of armored vehicles. The secretary's reply: "As you know, you go to war with the Army you have. They're not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time."