Fourth of five parts: Haunted, postwar Iraq

The failure of the Bush administration to plan for postwar Iraq compromised a swift military victory, and now jeopardizes plans to nurture democracy.

A lethal hubris, plus prewar and postwar arrogance, are undermining public support at home, as they already have abroad and among the Iraqi people. This is a reality wholly separate from debates over the motives and credibility of the administration in the runup to the war to remove Saddam Hussein from power.

The combined consequences of an ignorance of history and culture and failure to look ahead are reflected in lives lost to a virulent insurgency, the ballooning cost of the war, growing debates in Congress on the adequacy of troop levels, and a dangerous loss of trust and credibility.

From the start, the Bush administration refused to accept any dissent from the idea the entire campaign could be done, essentially, on the cheap.

White House economic adviser Lawrence Lindsey was shoved out the door after he estimated the war might cost as much as $200 billion. Military and reconstruction costs will fly past that number.

Army Chief of Staff Gen. Eric Shinseki predicted it would take 250,000 troops to maintain security, destroy weapons and oversee humanitarian aid and reconstruction after the war. Paul Wolfowitz, then the No. 2 official at the Pentagon, said the number was wildly off the mark. Shinseki was pushed toward retirement.

Now the topic is the strength of the insurgency, a blend of internecine battles for political position, nationalist outrage at the U.S. occupation and sectarian strife. Vice President Dick Cheney described the insurgency as in its last throes. Gen. John Abizaid, top U.S. military commander in Iraq, told a Senate committee the insurgency had not grown weaker in the past six months. Even Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld spoke of an insurgency lasting a dozen years.

Concern about the absence of U.S. planning for postwar nation-building long predates the war. The controversial Downing Street memo of July 2002, which circulated at the top levels of British Prime Minister Tony Blair's government, is best known for comments that intelligence and facts were being fixed to justify the war.

Often overlooked is the observation, "There is little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action."

U.S. military leaders expressed the same concerns in the midst of waging the war, according to accounts by embedded journalists. Poor prior planning emerged during the conflict as soldiers died for lack of adequate supplies of body armor and properly protected military trucks and transports.

The Bush administration's failed peace in Iraq draws its most stinging rebuke from a former insider, Larry Diamond, a Stanford professor and Hoover Institution senior fellow, who was recruited by a former colleague, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, to work for the Coalition Provisional Authority and help Iraq prepare to govern itself.

Diamond believes democracy can yet prevail in Iraq but efforts have been compromised by arrogance, ignorance, isolation and incompetence. Fundamentally, the failure to plan for the peace meant never having enough military and civilian resources to manage.

A primary failing was taking the job of post-conflict reconstruction and nation-building from the State Department and handing it to the Pentagon, which left the plans untouched. Disbanding the Iraqi military and purging Saddam's Baath Party from the civil service destroyed the economy and put skilled people — including teachers — out of work.

A U.S. attitude of occupation and impulse for control fueled deep resentments among Iraqis who want Americans out. Diamond says the U.S. failed to consult early and often enough with Iraqis and the failure of planning included translators, interpreters, secure vehicles and helicopters to get Americans out to build support.

Diamond opposes a snap withdrawal from Iraq, but he believes the U.S. has to be clear about eventual plans to leave, and that means no permanent military bases. He argues exiting will require more troops on the ground and a heavier financial commitment.

Americans who doubt they were told the full truth about the Iraq war can know for certain their government failed to plan for, and be candid about, the full cost in blood and treasure.